(Text: Michael Wegerich)
On a sunny autumn morning in 1977 a deceptive calm lay over Marxwalde airfield. In the early hours a combat alert was triggered. 36 combat-ready MiG-21M / MF in hardened aircraft shelters were manned by personnel (technicians and pilots) assigned to the combat crew. The pilots sat strapped in the MiG cockpits, ready to start the engines. I sat in a MiG-21MF of the 3rd squadron.
The combat alert was not unexpected but had been announced for a long time. Only the exact time was always a surprise. In recent weeks, when the duty shift was announced, we were told not only who was to man which aircraft in which shelter at which readiness state, but also in which order to taxi and take off in the event of a wing scramble. In recent months we had practised the wing launch with 36 aircraft. First, 12 MiGs of one squadron lined up in take-off position at the western end and 12 MiGs at the eastern end of the runway. Another 12 MiG-21s stood ready in front of the grass runway. After the last pilot had reported ready for take-off, the tower gave take-off clearance simultaneously to the squadron at the eastern end and to the one in front of the grass runway. When the last aircraft heading west lifted off over the canopies of those waiting, the squadron at the western end also received take-off clearance. Once this take-off procedure worked reliably, the wing launch was practised on the move, without stopping at the take-off position. Here it was important that everyone taxied out of his shelter in the specified order and that the squadron was already in the specified order while taxiing, so as to take off swiftly on the move in the ordered battle formation. At first this procedure did not work smoothly. Sometimes someone taxied out of his shelter too early and was suddenly in the wrong position. Someone else reported a delay or a defect too late, so that others waited too long and the taxi intervals and time delays became too large. You had to pay close attention and know the taxi order, the aircraft numbers and the call signs of the pilots of your squadron exactly. Taxiing at the wrong time could cause chaos. With every training session we got better. The necessary radio commands and coordination by radio became fewer and fewer. The specified time of 10 minutes between the alert and the lift-off of the last aircraft could be met and, after further training, even beaten. The alarm signal tore through the calm on the airfield. 36 shelter doors opened almost simultaneously, and engines could be heard starting everywhere on the airfield. A short time later the aircraft taxied out of the shelters. After my engine had been started and I was ready to taxi, my technician went forward and looked out of the door for the first taxiing aircraft. He, too, knew which aircraft I had to follow. At a sign from him I increased rpm and the aircraft began to move slowly – and I already saw the aircraft I had to follow rolling past. The special thing about this day was that radio silence was in force and could only be broken in the event of aircraft failures or other special occurrences. We taxied at very short intervals, but staggered sideways so as not to get into the jet blast of the aircraft ahead. The taxi speeds laid down for normal combat training (30 km/h on taxiways, 15 km/h in front of the flightline, 5 km/h in turns) were no longer observed. 60 km/h and more were not unusual. On rolling onto the runway we were already in take-off position, lit the afterburner while rolling and followed the aircraft still on their take-off run. After not even 10 minutes of constant engine noise, Marxwalde airfield fell silent again. The wing command post and the fighter control centre, on the other hand, had their hands full. The 36 aircraft were split into squadron battle formations, tactical groups or other formations and deployed for different tasks in different areas.
With this wing launch, 36 MiG-21M / MF combat aircraft with armament and 36 pilots of fighter wing JG-8 escaped from an assumed enemy nuclear strike on Marxwalde airfield within 8 minutes. When at the end of the 1970s NATO's intention became known to replace the "Pershing 1" nuclear missile systems on West German territory with "Pershing 2" intermediate-range strategic missile systems, increasing them to 108 systems, and to deploy 96 cruise missiles and 156 operational-tactical nuclear missile systems, which in "operations against the air war potential" of the Warsaw Pact forces could also be directed against airfields of the East German Air Force, corresponding measures were initiated. One of them was the procedure for preserving the combat capability of a wing by escaping in time from the effects of a nuclear strike on an airfield. After the standard time of 10 minutes had been reliably beaten in training, 8 minutes was set as the standard time. However, this time could only be achieved with a high level of training and under optimal conditions. At the airfields of the East German Air Force, all possibilities for a simultaneous take-off of all wing aircraft from concrete and grass surfaces were used, including at Marxwalde by JG-8 with a 50 m wide concrete runway and a 40 m wide grass runway. At other airfields of the 1st Air Defence Division, such as Preschen, an 80 m wide concrete runway and a 50 m wide grass runway were used. Here take-offs in flights of four from the concrete runway and in pairs from the grass were possible without problems. In addition, JG-3 had an 18 m wide auxiliary runway and the Forst motorway section at its disposal. At Holzdorf, JG-1 could only use a 37.5 m wide concrete runway, but in addition a 40 m wide grass runway and a 12 m wide auxiliary runway. However, to minimise surprise and risk for a wing, decentralised dispersal of the fighter wings was planned in the event of a threat of war and carried out and practised in exercises. Thus only one squadron remained at the main base. A second one, the deployment squadron, was stationed at an assigned field airfield – for JG-8 it was Müncheberg airfield – and a further squadron was to deploy to an unknown landing site, a motorway, a well-built road or an airfield of the GST (Society for Sport and Technology).