(Text: Michael Wegerich)
In the second half of the 1970s, with the introduction of a new training programme and after initial experience with the MiG-21M and MF combat aircraft – improved compared with the MiG-21PF and SPS, but also more complex – the demands on the effectiveness of combat training had increased. Manoeuvrability, altitude and speed range, but above all all-weather capability and the variety of weapons and tactical procedures and their application increased the demands on aircrew training. One element for organising combat training more effectively was the use of the new on-board objective monitoring equipment available with the MiG-21M / MF. This included the SSh-45 gun camera for photographing visually visible targets and the reticle of the optical sight, the PAU-473 for photographing the radar display, the recorder registering individual signals characteristic of combat conditions in the training missiles and, as a new feature, the SARPP-12 flight data recorder, which recorded 12 parameters instead of only the 2 of the barometric recorder of the MiG-21F-13 / PF and SPS.
The East German Air Force directive of 1983 on the evaluation of objective monitoring material, R 101/8/006, stated:
"To shorten the duration and increase the quality of aircrew training, training methods must be constantly perfected and maximum effectiveness of combat training achieved on every flight. The organisation of objective monitoring is of great importance for perfecting the methods of aircrew training.
Objective monitoring is a system of measures to be carried out by the commander, aimed at the comprehensive use of all standard on-board and ground equipment for
- assessment using instruments,
- analysis and evaluation of the actions of aircrew during flight as well as the work of the crews of the command posts and the flying control officers in directing the aircraft,
- checking the proper condition of the aircraft."
Elsewhere the directive stated:
"The trainee pilot benefits greatly from the use of objective monitoring. He gets the opportunity to compare the results of his flight objectively with the results of similar flights by more experienced pilots, to analyse mistakes correctly and to determine ways of further improving his level of training.
Experience in flying aerobatics at limit flight conditions, air combat manoeuvres and firing missiles and guns shows that aircrew carry out these flights more safely and with high flying discipline if the results are evaluated attentively and competently after each flight and any mistakes analysed. On the basis of such an analysis, the content of the task can logically be made more complex and a more complete and better use of the aircraft's flight-tactical characteristics and its armament by the pilot can be achieved."
Indeed, after conversion in 1976 from the MiG-21F-13 of training wing JAG-15 to the MiG-21M / MF of fighter wing JG-8, the way flights were evaluated, and with it training, had changed. Whereas on the MiG-21F-13 only the film of the optical sight was used for evaluation when weapons were employed – the barometric recorder for altitude and speed was too inaccurate for a quick evaluation to be meaningful for assessing an exercise – the MiG-21M / MF offered a range of data for assessing the flight, which were processed at the evaluation centre and presented to the commanders or officers detailed for the assessment. Besides the recorder tape of the training missiles and the films of the optical and radar sights, it was the data of the SARPP flight data recorder that could reveal control errors, violations of flight parameters and deviations from the flight mission. The SARPP recorded altitude, speed, vertical and lateral load factors, engine rpm and tailplane deflection angle as analogue signals, and the pressing of the trigger, engagement of the autopilot, throttle at maximum and afterburner, and pressure loss in the main and booster hydraulic systems as binary signals. I had adjusted to this, and during many a manoeuvre I imagined the lines of the different parameters on the evaluation sheet. Did they match the ideal lines? The day after flying, when the complete evaluation was presented, everyone could judge for himself how accurately he had kept to the relevant flight parameters and how good his own control technique was.
Often you were more critical of yourself than your superiors. Most of the time you forgot this "spy" during the flight and were fully concentrated on your task, as on a training flight for simulated attacks on ground targets with S-5 unguided rockets using the combat turn manoeuvre with a dive angle of 45 degrees. As in our flight (the smallest flying unit, with 4 pilots) we had only achieved dive angles between 30 and 40 but hardly 45 degrees on the last flights, we held a competition. Who would achieve the greatest dive angle out of the combat turn while still hitting the target with the rockets? I began the manoeuvre a little earlier and pulled the aircraft up even more steeply than on previous flights. After rolling out of the combat turns I had the feeling of being almost vertically above the target and achieved dive angles between 45 and 50 degrees. Impressed by the unusual angle and the ground approaching at 800–900 km/h, I pulled the aircraft out energetically after reaching firing range and simulating the rocket launch. All shots were hits verifiable on the gun camera film, and the minimum height of 200 m above the target was not violated either. I was pleased with myself and the flight. When I wanted to sign out for my next flight that day, I was told that I was no longer wanted for flying that day and my flight had been cancelled. The interim evaluation had revealed vertical load factors of between 6 and 8.5 g when pulling out of the dive on all attacks. The tactical procedure, however, only provided for load factors of 4.5 to 5 g for the pull-out, which were sufficient if all other flight parameters were observed. The high load factors were actually unnecessary and could have led to dangerous situations at the low pull-out heights. Only after a self-critical analysis of this flight in the following flight preparation was I allowed to prepare for the next day's flights. Without the SARPP flight data recorder, the deviations from the existing tactical procedure would never have been noticed.
However, the objective monitoring system could be outwitted for some mistakes, as on the following training flight. I was given the mission to intercept a training target at low altitude (300 m) and destroy it with R-3S (AA-2) passive infrared homing missiles. The fighter control centre gave me the appropriate target information and guidance commands so that I could quickly detect and intercept the target heading north east of the Oder. The target's manoeuvres made aiming only slightly more difficult. I was in firing position within permitted firing range, and the tone of the training missile signalled that the missile's infrared seeker had locked onto the target. I simulated 3 reliable launches of the R-3S at the target and then broke off the attack. As I was approaching Marxwalde airfield, I noticed that the missile tone had not gone out after the launch. Normally the signal goes out about 2 seconds after pressing the trigger, signalling the simulated departure of the missile. Something was wrong here! A check of the weapon switches showed me that the missile heating switch was not on, and thus the recorder tape of the training missile had not been running. So I had recorded three beautiful missile launches on the gun camera film, but without proof on the missile's recorder tape. I could have been accused of an operating error of the weapon system, and the flight would not have been passed. I could already hear the reproaches against me as a young lieutenant. Poor preparation! Repeat the flight! Waste of resources! I wanted to spare myself that. I needed a heat source as a target for the training missile. My training target was already far away from my airspace. Another problem arose even if a target were available. After further launches I would have 3 launches on the missile recorder tape but 6 launches on the film and 6 trigger signals on the SARPP flight data recorder. How was I to explain that? From the theory course for the MiG-21MF I still knew that not only the gun camera but also the SARPP's trigger signal sensor were switched on with the gun camera switch. If I now switched off the gun camera switch, further recording of launches on the film and the SARPP would no longer be possible. So I switched off the gun camera and switched on missile heating. All that was missing was a heat target. It was 12.30 p.m. on a cloudless summer day in 1976. The only reliable heat target left was the sun, directly above me. On afterburner I accelerated to 900 km/h, pulled the aircraft vertically up and aimed at the sun. Immediately I had the desired missile tone and pressed the trigger three times at the same intervals as before, putting three launches on the missile's recorder tape. Meanwhile the aircraft had climbed from 300 to almost 2000 m and I was not far from the airfield when, still inverted while recovering from the vertical manoeuvre, I saw a MiG entering the circuit below me from the right. That immediately gave me my excuse for the vertical manoeuvre. I had to avoid the other aircraft before entering the circuit myself. The evaluation of the objective monitoring material showed that this training flight had been completed with "very good" according to the assessment standard. There was never any question about this flight.
Ignorance of on-board monitoring and recording equipment and incorrect operation can lead to unjustified accusations if proof of correct action is missing.
After conversion to the MiG-21M / MF we had meanwhile reached a level of training that allowed us to be scheduled and used for the first combat duty shift during the day. This meant that within 30 minutes of an alert, whether at home or on duty, we had to be strapped into an assigned MiG-21M / MF in full flying kit and ready to start the engine for missions in all weather conditions from sunrise to sunset. As young lieutenants we were proud to be allowed to take on such a task. I had been allocated the first flat of my life and was busy renovating it. I was not on the duty roster that day. In an old tracksuit, spattered with white paint, I was standing on a ladder whitewashing the ceiling when the horn in the stairwell alerted the first duty shift. Although I had not been assigned, I dropped everything, ran down the stairs, jumped on my bicycle and pedalled as fast as I could to the 3rd squadron at the airfield. There I was assigned a MiG. I put on the prescribed flying equipment, hurried to the hardened aircraft shelter, climbed into the MiG's cockpit and strapped in. Not even 30 minutes had passed since the alert when the crew chief was able to report my readiness. The command post asked "big or small helmet?" We answered "half helmet". Then came the command "Start up". I started the engine and taxied briskly to the take-off position on the runway. As I rolled onto the runway, another aircraft rolled onto it in front of me almost simultaneously. We briefly exchanged call signs, reported ready for take-off and received take-off clearance as a pair. The pilot of the other MiG was also a lieutenant from the 3rd squadron. We were both trained as pair leaders, so it did not matter who led. As he rolled out seconds before me and I took up the wingman position, he took over the role of pair leader. Only for a short time, though, because the command post split us up while still climbing and assigned us different targets. After the very first course change I received target information and guidance commands in very quick succession. "Target from right to left, range 3". The guidance process was anything but textbook. I saw the target at the right edge of the screen moving quickly towards the centre. I thought: if I do not turn hard left immediately, I will lose the target. With 70 to 80 degrees of bank I turned left and could just keep the target blip in the aiming circle. I briefly switched to IFF interrogation (to avoid shooting down one of our own aircraft), saw the identification and pressed the lock-on button. An old, experienced lieutenant colonel (Brucke), who was in the air and listening on the radio, asked me during the process whether I could manage the engagement or needed support. I declined, as I had everything under control. The target was locked, I could just keep it in the aiming circle, firing range had been reached and I was moving quickly towards minimum firing range. I still managed to simulate firing two missiles before breaking off the attack. My first mission during an alert had been completed successfully – or so I thought. The next day, at the big evaluation of the alert in the wing, I expected a word of recognition, after all I had been at the aircraft within the ordered time without being on the duty roster and had replaced a missing pilot assigned to the duty shift. For my level of training I had ultimately mastered a difficult interception. Far from it. I was severely reprimanded for a breach of safety regulations, and the firing was rated "unsatisfactory". No IFF interrogation was visible on the gun camera film. This interrogation was required, however, to rule out engaging one of our own. I could not explain this. In the squadron, in a calm conversation with an experienced pilot, I learned that the gun camera takes 8 frames per second when the trigger is pressed, but before that only one frame every 2.5 seconds. To prove the IFF interrogation I would have had to keep the switch on for at least 2.5 seconds. A long time given the situation and the time pressure I had been under the day before. I also learned that with the radar interrogation switched on, you could switch to lock-on / target tracking without any problem. That saved time and one action. This "mistake" never happened to me again in my 20-year flying career. The pilot who had been assigned to the duty shift and had not turned up for the alert was not asked for his reasons, let alone reprimanded. In future, I never again rushed to the aircraft during an alert unless I was on the duty roster.
But the objective monitoring equipment also had its good sides. In case of doubt it could prove one's innocence.
Besides the main combat tasks of the fighter units and crews, they could also be used for aerial reconnaissance. The Air Force service regulation DV 111/0/025 Combat Employment of the Fighter Forces of 1989 laid down the following regarding aerial reconnaissance:
"176. (1) The fighter squadron is to carry out aerial reconnaissance in flights or pairs in the enemy's tactical and immediate operational depth according to plan or simultaneously with the fulfilment of other combat tasks.
(2) Objects of aerial reconnaissance by the fighter units are:
- enemy operational-tactical missile units in their deployment areas,
- nuclear-capable means of the enemy artillery in firing positions,
- enemy airfields,
- defence sectors, zones and strongpoints of the enemy troops,
- enemy air defence forces and means,
- enemy rail and road transports,
- enemy command bodies, command posts and radio-electronic means.
In addition, the fighter units are used for reconnaissance of the air situation and the weather. (3) The combat task of aerial reconnaissance of particularly important objects is to be assigned to the crews directly by the commander or chief of staff of the wing. 177. (1) As methods of aerial reconnaissance for fulfilling the ordered combat tasks, the fighter units are to use:
- visual observation,
- aerial photographic reconnaissance,
- aerial reconnaissance with radio-electronic means.
(2) Visual observation is to be used on all combat flights with the aim of informing the command bodies immediately of any changes in the situation." As a young lieutenant I received the task for my first training flight in aerial reconnaissance directly from the deputy commander for flying training. The flight mission was: reconnaissance of the surface-to-air missile site near PRÖTZEL from a height of 300 m and drawing a sketch of the appearance and layout of the SAM unit's facilities after landing. I had never heard of this place before, let alone of a SAM site. Had an older pilot not given me a tip, I would not even have found the place on the map. Now everything seemed quite simple. I only had to find the village of PRÖTZEL north-east of Strausberg and then I would also discover the SAM positions. In sunshine and good visibility it was not complicated either. The military concrete roads, which ended at partly camouflaged buildings or bunkers, quickly gave the position away. I was impressed by the size of the facility. Bunkers and buildings connected by concrete roads, parked fuel trucks and special vehicles, and the SAMs on their launchers pointing at the sky could be seen. It was real fun to fly over and observe the positions. As I still had plenty of time until the planned landing and enough fuel, I set the engine to 100 % power and let the aircraft run. On reaching 800 km/h I applied 70 to 80 degrees of bank and pulled the aircraft into a 180-degree turn. Speed dropped to 600 km/h, and again I let the MiG accelerate. So I flew around the positions for about 20 minutes at 300 m and 600 to 800 km/h. I had seen everything and memorised it. Drawing a sketch was now no problem. When I parked the aircraft on the flightline after the 35-minute flight, the wing leadership was already waiting for me. The SARPP film was taken from me straight away, and I was accused of having terrorised, in low flight for 20 minutes, a SAM unit actively on air defence duty and prevented it from carrying out its task. Shocked by the accusation, I began to defend myself. I felt innocent, explained my flight mission and said from whom I had received it. The evaluation of the flight data recorder was available after a short time. It showed no violation of the ordered altitude or any other deviation from the flight mission. I was officially informed of this, and suddenly nobody was interested in the flight any more, let alone in the "reconnaissance results". Nobody wanted to see a sketch of the SAM battalion from me any more. I believe that afterwards a flight mission like the one I received was, if at all, only given after consultation with the SAM unit and when it did not have air defence duty to perform.
On this flight I was glad for the first time to have a flight data recorder in the aircraft. It was no longer just the "spy" looking over my shoulder while flying in order to present my mistakes. It was more!